Let’s face it, Ghana’s Parliament remains an important part of our governance system. As a Public Affairs professional, I acknowledge parliament as an important part of the policy-cycle, and as a policy influencing chamber, it remains a relevant target for lobbyists.
Parliament represents public opinion, helps the political system, reassesses bills proposed by the executive and watches over the executive and state bureaucracy.
Ordinarily, democratic constitutions deliberately divide the powers of government between different branches, so that they can check and balance each other. However, all is not well with this established system of checks and balances.
The fact is that, what were once powerful legislative assemblies with a great deal of control over the affairs of state, are now little more than rubber stamps for decisions made by their executives. The Parliament of Ghana has been variously characterized as weak, ineffective and ornamental.
It therefore came as welcome news when some relatively young and very accomplished Ghanaians decided to join the august house of parliament if given the opportunity by their political parties.
The names Kojo Oppong-Nkrumah, George Andah, Egbert Faibille Jnr, Ken Kuranchie and Philip Addison need no introduction.
Admittedly, these are ‘smart guys’ in their own rights and are seen by a considerable number of Ghanaians the middle class as people with the gravitas to reinvigorate an ineffective parliament.
Truth be told, I would love to have any of them as my representative in parliament. But there is a problem. Many, myself included, have questioned what impact these new crop of potential MPs can bring to the legislature.
This is against the backdrop that we missed the opportunity to effect the necessary constitutional reforms that would have restored a proper balance of power between the executive and legislature.
There are various reasons for believing that the balance of power between the executive and legislature may have shifted decisively in favour of the executive. And that is the case mainly in majoritarian political systems.
Ghana being a majoritarian system presents such an institutional example. With the President wielding immense executive powers, the executive arm of government dominates the policy-making process.
It is explicitly clear that even though the law-making power of Ghana is expressly vested in parliament, the executive branch both initiates and influences legislation.
The fact is, the amount of information, expert advice and technical drafting that usually goes into the preparation of a bills are often not easily available to parliament.
More importantly, MPs are unable to initiate legislation because they cannot count on the backing of their parties to get a bill through parliament to the same degree as the executive can. Modern political parties are tightly organized and highly disciplined. This has helped executives in majoritarian systems to maintain control of their parties and ensure that their policies and bills are accepted by legislatures.
Also, typical of the majoritarian system, MPs from incumbent parties in Ghana (who are always in the majority at least since the adoption of the 1992 constitution) vote along party lines obviously because none of them is ready to incur the wrath and displeasure of the President.
Remember the 1992 constitution demands that the President selects majority of his ministers from the law-making chamber. Ghana’s Parliament is therefore perceived as a ‘rubber stamp’ body. To put it bluntly, Ghana’s Parliament is by design not independent.
I know many a right-thinking Ghanaians favour a strong, independent Parliament and MPs who can, when necessary, stand up to the executive.
Unfortunately, I don’t see this happening with or without these ‘smart’ potential MPs. The structure of our legislative institution gives the executive tremendous control over the policy process thereby reducing Parliament to the level of junior partners.
It will even be worst should they end up in the minority. Remember our system creates sharp divisions between those who hold power and those who do not, and it does not allow the opposition much influence over government policy.
I am therefore of the belief that what should engage the minds of many a Ghanaian is whether these ‘smart’ potential MPs can question the status-quo and ‘stand up to’ a President from their own party.
I agree that the relationship between the Legislature and Executive should not be adversarial.
The fact however is, as it stands now, the executive and the legislative branches cooperate and act together; sometimes they fight and struggle for power.
But since democratic constitutions deliberately divide the powers of government between different branches to allow for effective checks and balances, there is nothing wrong with the political struggle between them.
As a matter of fact, this deliberate balance of power between the various arms of government (judiciary included), ensures that “they are bound together in a relationship of perpetual, mutual dependency”.
My worry is that the executive has directly or indirectly disabled the legislature albeit within the current constitutional and political arrangement.
Again, can these ‘smart guys’ stand up to their political parties – based on their convictions – damn the consequences? I honestly don’t think so.
As stated earlier, modern political parties are tightly organized and highly disciplined. This has helped executives in majoritarian systems to rather keep the legislature in check. An MP who desires to keep his or her seat cannot damn the consequences of his or her party – you will be kicked out and that will be done with impunity. Many MPs will not risk that.
So if you ask me, I will tell you I am excited about the prospect of having these ‘smart’ guys in the law-making chamber.
But I am afraid it will be business as usual unless we embark on the fundamental constitutional reforms that will restore a proper balance of power between the Executive and the Legislature.
NB: A majoritarian system is one in which a government commands a parliamentary majority and can create outright ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in legislative initiatives.
At the heart of the majoritarian model is the concentration of power in the hands of the political executive. It is exclusive, competitive and adversarial.
Majoritarian democracies typically have first-past-the-post electoral systems, two major political parties, single-party cabinets, unicameralism, and unitary and centralized governments.
The writer is a Public Relations Specialist. He holds an MSc in Corporate Communication and Public Affairs from the Aberdeen Business School of the Robert Gordon University, United Kingdom.
He is currently the founder and CEO of OBPR, a PR firm that specializes in Media Communications, Public Relations, Public Affairs and Events Management.
Email: philiposeibonsu84@gmail.com
